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Abstract
The establishment of a peacekeeping force is widely accepted to be an essential part of any
future Israeli-Palestinian peace accord. The final status settlement proposed by the Clinton Administration specified “[s]security arrangements that would be built around an international presence.”
However, while the need for a peacekeeping force appears to enjoy broad support, it should be
noted that the ”Road Map” proposed by the European Union, Russia, the United Nations, and
the United States (together ”the Quartet”) in 2003 does not suggest the inclusion of peacekeeping
forces, although it does envisage a monitoring mechanism for its interim phases. The authors set
out to examine, from an Israeli perspective, the feasibility of establishing a form of multinational
peacekeeping force as part of a future Israeli-Palestinian peace accord. Part I of this Article assesses past successes and failures of peacekeeping missions in and around Israel. Part II discusses
the reasons for the success and failure of those past peacekeeping missions. Part III identifies best
and worst case scenarios when implementing peacekeeping missions. The Article concludes by
suggesting that bilateral security cooperation with multinational oversight may be a better way of
dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than peacekeeping missions.
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INTRODUCTION
The establishment of a peacekeeping force is widely
accepted to be an essential part of any future Israeli-Palestinian
peace accord. The final status settlement proposed by the
Clinton Administration specified “[s]ecurity arrangements that
would be built around an international presence.”1 In discussing
the issue of security, American diplomat Dennis Ross, who was
one of the American negotiators of the 1995 Interim Agreement
on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the 1997 Protocol
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Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, and who served as
President Clinton’s Middle East coordinator, wrote: “[T]he key
lies in an international presence that can only be withdrawn by
the agreement of both sides.”2
Among the most prominent non-governmental initiatives
recommending the inclusion of peacekeeping forces are the
Geneva Accord3 and the Bipartisan Statement on US-Middle East
Peacemaking, entitled “A Last Chance for a Two-State IsraelPalestine Agreement” (“Bipartisan Statement”), drafted and
signed by ten former senior US government officials and
presented to the administration of US President Barack Obama.4
Although the need for a peacekeeping force appears to
enjoy broad support, it should be noted that the “Road Map”5
proposed by the European Union, Russia, the United Nations,
and the United States (together “the Quartet”) in 2003 does not
suggest the inclusion of peacekeeping forces, although it does
envisage a monitoring mechanism for its interim phases.
Similarly, the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative does not include any
mention of peacekeeping forces.6 Tellingly, however, former US
National Security Advisors Brent Snowcroft and Zbigniew
Brzezinski, both of whom were among the authors of the
Bipartisan Statement, have pointed out the need for
2. Id. at 802.
3. The Geneva Accord was launched on December 1, 2003. The Accord sets out a
Draft Permanent Status Agreement and a Model Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement. As
part of the proposed peace accord to be signed between a future Palestinian State and
the State of Israel, the Geneva Accord envisages the establishment of a multinational
force, which would form an “integral part of the Implementation and Verification
Group.” The Geneva Initiative, The Geneva Accord: A Model Israeli-Palestinian Peace
Agreement (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.geneva-accord.org/mainmenu/summary.
The stated purpose of the Multinational Force under the terms of the draft Peace
Agreement is “to provide security guarantees to the parties, act as a deterrent, and
oversee the implementation of the relevant provisions of this Agreement.” Id.
4. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ET AL., U.S./MIDDLE EAST PROJECT, A LAST CHANCE FOR A
TWO-STATE
ISRAEL-PALESTINE
AGREEMENT,
http://www.usmep.us/bipartisan_
recommendations/A_Last_Chance_for_a_Two-State_Israel-Palestine_Agreement.pdf
(last visited Sept. 25, 2010). Among its various recommendations and vision for a future
peace between Israel and a future Palestinian state, the Bipartisan Statement envisages
the establishment of a multinational force: “a coalition peacekeeping structure under
UN mandate featuring American leadership of a NATO force supplemented by
Jordanians, Egyptians, and Israelis.” Id. at 14.
5. The Roadmap: Full Text, BBC NEWS, Apr. 30, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2989783.stm.
6. The Council of Arab States, The Arab Peace Initiative (2002), available at
http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm.
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supplementing the initiative with a multinational peacekeeping
force.7
It is against this background that the authors set out to
examine, from an Israeli perspective, the feasibility of
establishing a form of multinational peacekeeping force as part
of a future Israeli-Palestinian peace accord. Part I of this Article
assesses past successes and failures of peacekeeping missions in
and around Israel. Part II discusses the reasons for the success
and failure of those past peacekeeping missions. Part III
identifies best and worst case scenarios when implementing
peacekeeping missions. The Article concludes by suggesting that
bilateral security cooperation with multinational oversight may
be a better way of dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
than peacekeeping missions.
I. ASSESSING THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF
PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN ISRAEL AND ALONG HER
BORDERS
A. What is “Peacekeeping”?
Before addressing the subject of peacekeeping and its place
in a future Arab-Israeli peace accord, it is useful to define what is
meant by the term “peacekeeping.” Peacekeeping is one of the
stated objectives of the United Nations. Article 1 of the United
Nations Charter declares among the United Nations’ purposes:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or
settlement of international disputes or situations which
might lead to a breach of the peace.8

This would appear to define peacekeeping in broad terms
that include negotiation and adjudication as well as active,

7. Brent Snowcroft & Zbigniew Brzezinski, Middle East Priorities for Jan. 21, WASH.
POST, Nov. 21, 2008, at A23.
8. U.N. Charter art. 1.
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coercive intervention. However, as Professor Erik Suy has
explained:
The peacekeeping system foreseen in the UN Charter has
not been realized. Instead, another concept or system has
been created and developed through the practice of the
organization: the UN peacekeeping operations, which can be
defined as actions involving the use of military personnel in
situations of international armed conflict on the basis of the
consent of all parties concerned and without resort to armed
force except for self-defense. The main difference from the
originally planned system is that these operations cannot be
considered as enforcement actions.9

The distinction between peacekeeping and peace
enforcement has also been made by the International Court of
Justice.10 The fundamental view that peacekeeping is based upon
consent and that peacekeepers may employ force only in selfdefense was reiterated in August 2000 in the Report of the Panel
on United Nations Peace Operations (“Brahimi Report,” also
commonly described as the “NYU Report”),11 which
recommended that “consent of the local parties, impartiality and
the use of force only in self-defense should remain the bedrock
principles of peacekeeping.”12 This view was adopted among the
“Basic Principles” of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:
Principles and Guidelines (“Capstone Doctrine”).13 Thus, while
peacekeeping forces often employ military personnel, and
although peacekeeping troops have been armed since the
deployment of the United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization (“UNTSO”) in Sinai in 1957, it should be borne in
mind that they are supplied only with defensive weapons to be
used solely for their own protection.14
9. Erik Suy, United Nations Peacekeeping System, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1143, 1143 (Peter Macalister-Smith ed., 2000).
10. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the
Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 163–72 (July 20).
11. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, U.N. Doc.
A/55/305, S/2000/809; U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., (Aug. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Brahimi
Report].
12. Id. at ix.
13. UN Dep’t of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations: Principles and Guidelines (2008), available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/
Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf [hereinafter Capstone Doctrine].
14. Suy, supra note 9, at 1146.
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In addition to United Nations peacekeeping operations,
peacekeeping is also carried out by multinational forces acting
with the consent of the parties outside of the United Nations
framework. For example, the Multinational Force in Sinai
(“MFO”) was established in 1982 to supervise Israel’s withdrawal
from the Sinai Peninsula.
Thus, “peacekeeping” is concerned with military or other
personnel engaged in observation, interposition, and
maintaining law and order within a state.15 The first type of
“peacekeeping,” observation, refers to the supervision of
compliance with the terms of an agreement between the parties
to a conflict, e.g., in the Arab-Israeli context, the United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization established in 1948, the United
Nations Disengagement Observer Force (“UNDOF”) established
in 1974, the Multinational Force in Sinai established in 1982, the
Multinational Force in Lebanon (“MNF”) established in 1982,
and the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (“TIPH
I”), a civilian observer force established in 1994 and reinstated in
1996 (“TIPH II”).
Interposition refers to situations where peacekeepers act as a
separation between the parties to a conflict, as in the case of the
United Nations Emergency Force (“UNEF”) established in 1957,
and UNEF II, established in 1973. A third type of force, often
grouped under the rubric of “peacekeeping” but not falling
within the strict definition of observation and interposition, is
that of military personnel engaged in maintaining internal law
and order within a state, e.g., the United Nations Interim Force
for Southern Lebanon (“UNIFIL”) established in 1978, and the
Multinational Force in Lebanon established in September 1982
following the withdrawal of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (“PLO”) from Beirut and the assassination of
Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel.
With this basic understanding of the nature and role of
peacekeeping forces, the Article now proceeds to examine and
evaluate the performance of the various missions deployed in the
context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

15. See Derek W. Bowett, International Military Force, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1267, 1268 (Peter Macalister-Smith ed., 1995).
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Tools for Assessing Success or Failure of a Peacekeeping Mission

In many cases, the determination of the overall success or
failure of a peacekeeping operation seems obvious—the most
extreme case, of course, being the outbreak of war or hostilities
despite the presence of an active peacekeeping operation.
However, a more structured approach than mere intuition is
preferable in analyzing the success, failure, or partial success or
failure of a peacekeeping operation. As American diplomat and
scholar Professor Dennis Jett notes, there is disagreement among
various experts in defining the factors by which to judge the
success or failure of a peacekeeping mission.16 Jett cites four
criteria, proposed by Canadian Professor Duane Bratt, for
assessing the success or failure of a peacekeeping mission:
“completion of the mandate, facilitation of conflict resolution,
containment of the conflict, and limitation of casualties.”17 This
seems to expand upon the proposal by Professor Paul Diehl that
peacekeeping operations be evaluated in accordance with their
performance on two criteria: the limitation of armed conflict and
conflict resolution.18
C. United Nations Peacekeeping Missions deployed in the Arab-Israeli
Conflict
1. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNTSO was established by UN Security Council Resolution
50 on May 29, 194819 in order to assist the UN Mediator and
Truce Commission supervise the truce between Israel and the
Arab forces that invaded her following Israel’s declaration of
independence.20 However, the truce lasted only four weeks, and
fighting again erupted.21 An indefinite ceasefire was ordered by
Resolution 54 on July 15, 1948, and a second group of UNTSO
military observers was deployed with each of the Arab armies and
the Israeli Defense Forces, with each Israeli armed group, in
16. DENNIS C. JETT, WHY PEACEKEEPING FAILS 19 (1999).
17. Id. (citing Duane Bratt, Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations, INT’L
PEACEKEEPING, Winter 1996, at 64).
18. PAUL F. DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 34 (1993).
19. See S.C. Res. 50, U.N. Doc. S/RES/50 (May 29, 1948).
20. Milos Struger, The UNTSO Story, 35 U.N. CHRON., Sept. 1998, at 43.
21. Id.
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Jerusalem, along the coast, and in the various ports and airports
within the area of the truce. In 1949, following the signing of the
four General Armistice Agreements between Israel and Egypt,
Israel and Jordan, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and Syria,
UNTSO’s mandate was extended to supervise these agreements.22
Currently, the mandate of UNTSO is “to monitor ceasefires,
supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from
escalating and assist other United Nations peacekeeping
operations in the region.”23
Since the commencement of its operation in 1948, UNTSO
has maintained a presence in the Middle East, including being
attached to the various additional peacekeeping forces that have
been deployed over time, such as the United Nations
Disengagement Observer Force (“UNDOF”)24 and the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.25 Currently, the force consists
of 151 military observers supported by 88 international civilian
personnel and 123 local civilian staff. It has its headquarters in
Jerusalem. The international personnel of UNTSO are drawn
from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile,
China, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Nepal,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.26
Overall, UNTSO has succeeded in its declared purposes of
monitoring ceasefires, supervising armistice agreements, and
assisting other UN peacekeeping operations in the region.27
However, UNTSO has been less successful in carrying out its
mission of preventing isolated incidents from escalating. The
clashes between Egyptian outposts and Israeli patrols along the
22. Id.
23. UNTSO Mandate, http://untso.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1201 (last
visited Sept. 17, 2010).
24. See infra Part I.C.4.
25. See infra Part I.C.5; About UNTSO, http://untso.unmissions.org/
Default.aspx?tabid=1204 (last visited Oct. 17, 2010); see also Robert Satloff & Rachel
Stroumsa, A UN ‘Protection’ Force for Palestinians: Background and Implications, WASH. INST.
NEAR E. POL’Y, Nov. 17, 2000, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
FOR
templateC05.php?CID=1987.
26. UNTSO Facts and Figures, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/
untso/facts.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2010).
27. See Rosalyn Higgins, The June War: The United Nations and Legal Background, 3 J.
OF CONTEMP. HIST. 253, 255–57 (1968) (discussing the successes and failures of
UNTSO).
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Sinai border in the early 1950s and the incursions into Israel by
Egyptian trained fedayeen (Palestinian terrorist militias) during
that period are among the examples that demonstrate this lack of
success. Following the Suez Crisis, the ensuing Sinai Campaign in
October 1956 further emphasized the inability of UNTSO to
prevent war. Indeed, due to UNTSO’s ineffectiveness, following
the Sinai Campaign, Israel declared its unwillingness to
cooperate further with UNTSO.28 This set the stage for the
establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force. In
addition to the shortcomings of UNTSO on the Egyptian-Israeli
front, it should also be noted that, as the former President of the
International Court of Justice Rosalyn Higgins observed, “the
operation of the Mixed Armistice Commission machinery had, in
the case of the Jordan-Israel and Syria-Israel Agreements, become
very unsatisfactory.”29
2. United Nations Emergency Force I (“UNEF I”)
In an effort to secure an end to the Suez Crisis, then
Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson,
proposed a plan that led to the establishment of the UNEF.30
Deployed on November 15, 1956, UNEF can be said to be the
first real “peacekeeping” force, as that term is conceptualized
today. Among the main features that characterized this new UN
force were: (1) leadership: the force was directed by UN
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, and fell under the field
command of a neutral officer appointed by the head of the UN
executive; (2) composition: country contributors to the force
were not from any major powers; (3) neutrality: it was intended
that the force be neutral as to both its purpose and its actions;
and (4) positioning: the force was intended to be positioned
between the parties to the conflict, acting as a sort of physical
barrier between the warring parties.31
28. Id. at 259–60.
29. Id. at 260. UNTSO is the UN observer force of the Mixed Armistice
Commissions established under the General Armistice Agreements between Israel and
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Id. at 254.
30. DIEHL, supra note 18, at 31; see also G.A. Res. 1000 (ES-I), U.N. GAOR, 1st
Emergency Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/3354, at 2–3 (Nov. 5, 1956).
31. See DIEHL, supra note 18, at 31; UNEF I Background, http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1backgr2.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2010) (discussing
the establishment of UNEF).
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The mandate of UNEF I was to “secure and supervise the
cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed
forces of France, Israel, and the United Kingdom from Egyptian
territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between
the Egyptian and Israeli forces and to provide impartial
supervision of the ceasefire.”32 To enforce this mandate, the
force consisted of between 6073 military personnel supported by
international and local civilian staff at its maximum, and 3378
military personnel supported by international and local civilian
staff at the time of its withdrawal in May 1967. The force was
headquartered in Gaza and its international troops were drawn
from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India,
Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia.33
UNEF I did succeed in securing and supervising the
cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the various armed
forces as set out in its mandate, but unfortunately, the inherent
conditions of its mandate made it impossible for UNEF I to keep
the peace. As Professor N.D. White wrote:
Despite proposals that UNEF I should guarantee passage
through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, UNEF’s
mandate and functions were to derive from the General
Assembly’s resolutions which basically called for four things:
a cease fire, the cessation of hostilities, abstention from
military raids and incursions, and scrupulous observance of
the armistice agreements.34

Additionally, in accordance with the guiding principles
presented by the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly,
UNEF I was deployed entirely on Egyptian territory with the
consent of the Egyptian government.35 As a result, UNEF had no
power to guarantee free passage through the Suez Canal or the
Gulf of Aqaba, and as a guest on Egyptian territory, UNEF had
no choice but to withdraw when Egypt ordered it to leave in May
1967.36
32. UNEF I – Mandate, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/
unef1mandate.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2010).
33. UNEF I – Facts and Figures, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/
past/unef1facts.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2010).
34. N.D. WHITE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY 193 (1990); see also Higgins, supra note 27, at 261.
35. UNEF I Background, supra note 31.
36. Id.
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While some opinions have been expressed questioning
whether the UN Secretary General had no choice but to order
UNEF’s withdrawal,37 White has pointed out that if UNEF had
remained, its continued presence would have been hostile and its
function would have become one of peace enforcement rather
than of peacekeeping.38 Regardless of the historical merits of the
debate, the Capstone Doctrine now states: “[I]n the absence of
such consent [of the main parties], a United Nations
peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conflict;
and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its
intrinsic role of keeping the peace.”39
In assessing the shortcomings of UNEF I, it is worth
recalling Suy’s definition of peacekeeping as “actions involving
the use of military personnel in situations of international armed
conflict on the basis of the consent of all parties concerned and without
resort to armed force except for self-defense”40 and noting
White’s observation that “Egypt’s consent to UNEF I is illustrative
of the basis of all observer and peacekeeping functions. It also
demonstrates their weakness.”41
3. UNEF II
UNEF II was established on October 25, 1973, and was
tasked with supervising the implementation of the ceasefire
between Egyptian and Israeli forces following the Yom Kippur
War.42 Further, UNEF II was charged with using its best efforts to
prevent a recurrence of the fighting and to cooperate with the
International Committee of the Red Cross in its humanitarian
missions in the area.43 UNEF II enjoyed the support and
cooperation of UNTSO.44 While UNEF II’s mandate remained
unchanged throughout its deployment, its activities evolved and
were adapted in accordance with the changing role dictated by
37. See Higgins, supra note 27, at 262; see also WHITE, supra note 34, at 193.
38. WHITE, supra note 34, at 193.
39. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 13, at 32.
40. Suy, supra note 9, at 1443(emphasis added).
41. WHITE, supra note 34, at 193.
42. S.C. Res. 340, ¶ 3, U.N. SCOR, 28th Sess., U.N. Doc S/11046/Rev.1 (Nov. 25,
1973); see also UNEF II Mandate, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/
unef2mandate.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2010).
43. See UNEF II Mandate, supra note 42; see also DIEHL, supra note 18, at 48.
44. See UNEF II Mandate, supra note 42.
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the peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel that ultimately
led to the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty signed on March 26, 1979.45
The signing of the peace treaty heralded the end of the mission
of UNEF II, but it remained in the region until July 24, 1979.46
Clearly, UNEF II was successful in carrying out its mandated
mission.47 While the presence of UNEF II was not the direct
cause of the peace agreement, it may reasonably be said that its
presence contributed to a calmer environment in which the
Egyptian-Israeli negotiations could be pursued.48 Although the
success of UNEF II is clear, ultimately the key to its success
appears to have been the commitment of the parties to the
conflict to cooperate with the peacekeeping forces and their
mutual desire to reach an accord.
4. United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
In May 1974, following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a
disengagement agreement was signed between Israel and Syria.49
Among its provisions, the agreement provided for an area of
separation between Israel and Syria, and the establishment of
UNDOF to monitor the implementation of the provisions of the
agreement.50 The mandate of UNDOF is fairly limited and
empowers UNDOF to “[m]aintain the ceasefire between Israel
and Syria; [s]upervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian
forces; and [s]upervise the areas of separation and limitation, as
provided in the May 1974 Agreement on Disengagement.”51 The
mandate of UNDOF has been continuously extended, and
UNDOF continues to maintain an area of separation between

45. Treaty of Peace, Isr.-Egypt, Mar. 26, 1979, 1136 U.N.T.S. 115, 117.
46. UNEF II Mandate, supra note 42.
47. See DIEHL, supra note 18, at 48–49.
48. See id. at 49.
49. Agreement on Disengagement Between Israeli and Syrian Forces, Syria-Isr., May
31, 1974, reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/11302/Add.1, Annex 1 (May
30, 1974) [hereinafter Agreement on Disengagement]; see also United Nations
Disengagement Observer Force [UNDOF] Background, http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/missions/undof/background.shtml(last visited Sept. 13, 2010).
50. Agreement on Disengagement, supra note 49, ¶¶ B.3, E.
51. UNDOF Mandate, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/undof/
mandate.shtml (last visited Sept. 13, 2010); see also S.C. Res. 350, 29th Year, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/30 (May 31, 1974).
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Israel and Syria. No military forces other than UNDOF are
permitted in the area of separation.52
Currently UNDOF’s activities include clearing and marking
the existence of minefields and assisting the movement and
services of the International Committee of the Red Cross.53
UNDOF’s current 1035 troops are assisted by 76 UNTSO military
observers from UNTSO’s Golan Group and supported by
international civilian personnel and 105 local civilian staff.54 Its
international troops are drawn from Austria, Canada, Croatia,
India, Japan, and the Philippines.55
The Syrian-Israeli border has been relatively quiet since the
end of hostilities in 1973, and UNDOF has successfully carried
out its limited monitoring role. However, the underlying conflict
between Syria and Israel has not been resolved. Indeed, in 1984,
Houghton and Trinka noted that “the underlying causes for the
earlier Syrian-Israeli hostilities have not been resolved and the
situation remains a potentially dangerous one.”56 The situation
remains tense as a result of Syria’s continued provision of
sanctuary to Palestinian terrorist groups operating against Israel,
and its support of Hamas and Hezbollah.57 The authors would
suggest that while the presence of UNDOF may contribute to
maintaining quiet along the Israel-Syria frontier, another factor
contributing to that quiet is that Syria is able to avoid direct
confrontation with Israel, instead acting against them by means
of third-parties like Hezbollah and Hamas.58 The authors would
also not discount the factor of Syria’s desire to improve its
relations with the United States, which continues to impose
sanctions on Syria pursuant to the provisions of the Syrian
Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act.59
52. UNDOF Background, supra note 49.
53. Id.
54. UNDOF Facts and Figures, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/
undof/facts.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
55. Id.
56. ROBERT B. HOUGHTON & FRANK G. TRINKA, MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN
THE MIDDLE EAST 15 (1984).
57. Background Note: Syria, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/
bgn/3580.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
58. Jack Khoury, Report: Syria Supplying Long-Range Missiles to Hezbollah, HAARETZ
(Tel Aviv), Jan. 1, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1121298.html.
59. Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, H.R.
1828, 108th Cong. (2003); Implementation of the Syria Accountability Act, U.S. DEP’T OF
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5. United Nations Interim Force for Southern Lebanon
a. UNIFIL I
During the 1970s, violent clashes between Palestinian
terrorist groups or various Lebanese militias and Israeli forces
continuously erupted along the Lebanese border.60 These were
intensified by the influx of Palestinian militants who fled Jordan
following Black September in 1970.61 In view of its mandate as an
observer force, UNTSO forces stationed in southern Lebanon
were not in a position to provide an effective response to the
increasing violence. Following an attack upon an Israeli tourist
bus in March 1978 carried out by Palestinian terrorists who
crossed into Israel from Lebanon, the Israeli army responded
with Operation Litani,62 aimed at ridding southern Lebanon of
the terrorist bases that had been established there.63
Following the Israeli incursion, the Lebanese government
submitted a strong protest to the UN Security Council, stating
that it had no involvement with the Palestinian attack. In
response, the Security Council adopted Resolutions 425 and 426
calling for the immediate cessation by Israel of its military activity
in Lebanon, for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese
territory, and for the establishment of a United Nations Interim
Force in Southern Lebanon (“UNIFIL I”).64 The mandate of
UNIFIL I was to “[c]onfirm Israeli withdrawal from southern
Lebanon; [r]estore international peace and security; and [a]ssist
the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in
the area.”65 Thus, UNIFIL I can be said to have been mandated
with a dual role: one of peacekeeping and a second of
maintaining internal law and order in Lebanon. UNIFIL I was
not successful in carrying out its mandate, as is clear from its own

COMMERCE, http://www.bis.doc.gov/licensing/syriaimplementationmay14_04.htm (last
visited Sept. 17, 2010).
60. See DIEHL, supra note 18, at 56; see also UNIFIL Background, http://www.un.org/
en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/background.shtml (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
61. Id.
62. HOUGHTON & TRINKA, supra note 56, at 17.
63. Id. at 29.
64. S.C. Res. 425, ¶¶ 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/INF/34 (Mar. 19, 1978); S.C. Res. 426, ¶ 2,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/34 (Mar. 19, 1978).
65. UNIFIL
Mandate,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/
mandate.shtml (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
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description of the situation leading up to Israel’s Operation
Peace of the Galilee in June 1982.66 According to UNIFIL, Israel
invaded Lebanon “after intense exchange of fire in Southern
Lebanon and across the Israel-Lebanon border.”67
Following the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in
2000, UNIFIL I returned to its role in accordance with its original
mandate. During the period from 2000 until 2006, as UNIFIL
notes, “periods of quiet along the Blue Line [the Israel-Lebanon
border] were often followed by episodes of hostilities, with one of
the incidents across the Line resulting in the killing and
wounding of United Nations military observers. Tensions
between the parties did not at any point appreciably diminish.”68
This is an understatement in view of the effective takeover of
southern Lebanon by Hezbollah following Israel’s withdrawal,69
and the attacks across Israel’s border that ensued.70 UNIFIL I’s
ineffectiveness in carrying out its mandate was further evidenced
by the massive buildup of Hezbollah infrastructure and forces in
southern Lebanon that was revealed in the course of the 2006
Second Lebanon War.71
b. UNIFIL II
In response to the Second Lebanon War, the UN Security
Council adopted Resolution 1701 on August 11, 2006, article 8 of
which called for the following actions: (1) a full cessation of
hostilities; (2) the deployment by both the Lebanese army and
UNIFIL throughout southern Lebanon; and (3) the support by
Israel and Lebanon of a permanent ceasefire and long-term
solution to be based, inter alia, on security arrangements aimed
at maintaining a southern Lebanon free of military activities and
weaponry (other than those of the Lebanese government and
UNIFIL) and at the cessation of the sale and supply of arms to
66. UNIFIL Background, supra note 60.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, The Second Lebanon War One Year Later (July
2007), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/Behind+the+Headlines/The+
Second+Lebanon+War+-+One+year+later+-+July+2007.htm [hereinafter One Year Later].
70. ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Hizbullah Attacks Along Israel’s Northern Border
May 2000–June 2006, http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/exeres/9EE216D7-82EF-4274-B80D6BBD1803E8A7frameless.htm?NRMODE=Published (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
71. One Year Later, supra note 69.
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Lebanon, except as authorized by the Lebanese government.72
To attain these goals, the Security Council extended UNIFIL’s
force “in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of
operations” such that the force was increased to a maximum of
15,000 troops (UNIFIL II).73 UNIFIL’s original mandate was
extended to provide, inter alia: (1) the monitoring of the
cessation of hostilities; (2) the accompaniment and support of
the Lebanese army in its deployment throughout southern
Lebanon; and (3) the assistance in ensuring humanitarian access
to civilian populations and the return of displaced persons.74
Further, UNIFIL II is authorized to
take all necessary action in areas of deployment . . . to ensure
that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities
of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it
from discharging its duties . . . and to protect United Nations
personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the
security and freedom of movement of United Nations
personnel, humanitarian workers and . . . to protect civilians
under imminent threat of physical violence.75

Although the Israeli border with Lebanon has remained
relatively calm, it would appear that Hezbollah activities and
military build-up, including stockpiling of arms and weaponry,
have continued, and UNIFIL II, even with its expanded troop
base and broadened mandate, has proved inadequate for
preventing such activities.76 As for UNIFIL’s II contribution to
the relative calm along Israel’s northern border since the end of
hostilities in August 2006, former Israeli diplomat and Director
of the Institute for National Security Studies Oded Eran explains:
In reality, this restraint comes from the policy decision of
Hizballah’s leaders to focus on the domestic agenda and
solidify its political position in Lebanon. Hizballah has also
been deterred militarily by the calculation that Israel would
respond overwhelmingly to any provocation, striking the
Shiite organization and/or its two major patrons, Syria and
72. S.C. Res. 1701, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1701 (Aug. 11, 2006).
73. Id. ¶ 11.
74. Id.
75. Id. ¶ 12.
76. Nicholas Blanford, UN Resolution 1701: A View from Lebanon, WASH. INST. FOR
NEAR E. POL’Y, Oct. 21, 2008, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.
php?CID=2940.

16

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34:1

Iran. . . . [Instead]
Hizballah
has
benefitted
tremendously . . . fully recovering from the 2006 war and
improving its political and military position in Lebanon.
Under the lull provided by the ceasefire, the organization
has managed to avoid paying a price for triggering the 2006
war and has reasserted itself even more forcefully in
Lebanese politics.77

Recent rocket fire at Israel from southern Lebanon casts
further doubt on the effectiveness of UNIFIL II, while recent
discoveries of arms caches and explosive pits in the area under
UNIFIL II control appear to indicate that Hezbollah has resumed
its activities despite UNIFIL II increased presence.78 Additionally,
reports that Hezbollah has installed long-range missile
emplacements to the north of the area under UNIFIL II control79
raise questions as to the usefulness of an “interposition” of
peacekeepers to maintain a buffer zone. Hezbollah’s behavior
sheds light upon the problems faced by a peacekeeping force
when its mission does not enjoy the support of one or more of
the parties to the conflict, or the full cooperation of the host
state that it is meant to aid in restoring and maintaining order.
D. Non-United Nations Peacekeeping Missions
1. Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai
The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, an
extra-UN observer and peacekeeping force, was set up under the
terms of a Protocol to the Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt
signed on August 3, 1981.80 Annex I of the Peace Treaty called
for the establishment of a UN observer force in the Sinai, but, as
the date for Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai (April 25, 1982)
drew closer, the establishment of such a force was cast into doubt

77. Oded Eran, UN Resolution 1701: A View from Israel, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR E.
POL’Y, Oct. 20, 2008, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2939.
78. See Further Evidence of Hezbollah’s Military Activity, INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORISM
INFO. CTR. (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/
English/eng_n/html/hezbollah_e016.htm; Rocket Fire in Northern Israel, INTELLIGENCE
AND TERRORISM INFO. CTR. (Sept. 13, 2009), http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/
malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/lebanon_e001.htm.
79. Howard Schneider, Hezbollah Rearms Away from Border; Future Clash with Israel
Could Be Broader, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2010, at A10.
80. Peace Treaty, Egypt-Isr., Mar. 26, 1979, 1136 U.N.T.S. 115.
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due to the prospect of a Soviet veto in the Security Council.81
Indeed, on May 18, 1981, the President of the Security Council
advised the Egyptians that there was insufficient support in the
Security Council to establish the required UN observer force.82
The MFO did not enjoy the support of the entire
international community:
The Soviet Union and most of the Arab states refused to
cooperate because of the MFO’s association with the Camp
David Accords. . . . Even the United Kingdom, France, Italy,
and the Netherlands refused to participate until it was
agreed that their participation did not imply any change in
their position vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli issue.83

The United States, however, played a vital role in the
negotiations for, and establishment of, the force. It continues to
provide the force with both political and financial support.84
Indeed, the support of the United States has been one of the key
factors in the establishment and continued operation of the
MFO.85
Of significance, however, is the direct involvement of the
parties to the conflict in the establishment of the force, and their
continuing involvement in the MFO’s operations.86 The director
general of the MFO, who must be American, is appointed by
both parties on the recommendation of the United States, while
the MFO force commander is appointed by the director general
subject to the approval of Israel and Egypt. Further, Israeli and
Egyptian liaison officers meet at least monthly with the MFO
force commander, primarily regarding operational matters.87
The direct expenses of the MFO are funded in equal parts by
Egypt, Israel, and the United States. Contributions to the MFO
are also made by Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, and Switzerland.88 The participating nations (other than
the United States) do not contribute funds to the MFO and are
81. HOUGHTON & TRINKA, supra note 56, at 40.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 44.
84. Id. at 43.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 43, 47.
FORCE
88. Financial
Information,
MULTINATIONAL
http://www.mfo.org/financial.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2010).
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reimbursed for extraordinary costs related to their military
units.89
The MFO appears to be carrying out its mandate
successfully. Unlike the other peacekeeping missions examined,
the MFO was established in the terms of a peace treaty, and in
their mutual relations, the parties to that treaty have shown
themselves to be committed to its success. The mutual
cooperation between the parties in the formation and continued
operations of the MFO would also seem to constitute a factor in
the continuing success of the mission. Additionally, it should be
borne in mind that the MFO operates in a desert. The Sinai
Peninsula provides a natural buffer between Israel and Egypt,
and it is very sparsely populated.
Twenty-eight years of peacekeeping virtually without
incident might raise the question of whether the MFO actually
fulfills a real need, or whether its continued presence merely
reflects the absence of a concrete exit strategy. More ominously,
in August 2005 an MFO vehicle carrying members of the
Canadian contingent was damaged and the soldiers injured by an
improvised explosive device (“IED”) attack, and in April 2006 an
MFO vehicle was attacked by a suicide bomber.90 These incidents,
although isolated, raise the issue of peacekeepers becoming the
target of third-party “spoilers” and invite the question of
diminishing returns.
2. Temporary International Presence in Hebron
a. TIPH I
In 1994, there were several violent attacks in Hebron, including
the infamous shooting attack by Baruch Goldstein in the Cave of
the Patriarchs, in which twenty-nine Palestinians were killed.91
Following this attack, the UN Security Council passed Resolution
904, which called for an international presence in the city of
89. HOUGHTON & TRINKA, supra note 56, at 52.
90. See History, THE AUSTRALIAN OPERATION MAZURKA WEBSITE OF THE
MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS—MFO SINAI, http://www.defence.gov.au/
army/opmazurka/History.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2010); see also Kristina Davis, Suicide
Bombers Attack near Canadian Contingent Serving on Op CALUMET, MAPLE LEAF (Ontario),
May 10, 2006, at 4.
91. Clyde Haberman, Israel Panel Says Killer at Hebron Was Acting Alone, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 1994, at A1.
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Hebron in order to “guarantee the safety and protection of the
Palestinians.”92 On March 31, 1994, Israeli and Palestinian
representatives signed an agreement that established the
Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH I), a civilian
observer mission.93 TIPH I commenced operations on May 8,
1994 and comprised support staff and observers from Denmark,
Italy, and Norway.94 The mandate of TIPH I was (1) to provide by
their presence a feeling of security to the Palestinians of Hebron;
(2) to help promote stability and an appropriate environment
conducive to the enhancement of the well-being of the
Palestinians of Hebron and their economic development; (3) to
monitor the efforts to restore the safety of Palestinians and events
affecting it and the return to normal life in the city of Hebron;
and (4) to provide reports.95 The mandate of TIPH I came to an
end after just three months, due to the inability of the Israeli
government and the Palestinian leadership to reach agreement
on the extension of the mandate.96
b. TIPH II
On May 12, 1996, an interim TIPH mission was established
pursuant to the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip (“Interim Agreement” or “Oslo II”), signed at Taba
on September 28, 1995.97 The agreement called for the
reestablishment of a Temporary International Presence in
Hebron.98 This interim TIPH mission was composed entirely of
Norwegian members and was replaced in January 1997 by TIPH
II in accordance with both the Protocol Concerning the

92. S.C. Res. 904, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/Res/904 (Mar. 18, 1994); see Establishment of
TIPH, TEMP. INT’L PRESENCE IN THE CITY OF HEBRON [TIPH], http://www.tiph.org/en/
About_TIPH/Establishment of TIPH (last visited Sept. 29, 2010) [hereinafter
Establishment of TIPH].
93. See Establishment of TIPH, supra note 92.
94. Id.
95. See Justus R. Weiner, The Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron: A
Unique Approach to Peacekeeping, 16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 281, 312–13 (1997).
96. Establishment of TIPH, supra note 92.
97. The Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Interim Agreement on the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, Isr.-P.L.O., Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551 [hereinafter Interim
Agreement].
98. Id. art. VII, ¶ 10.
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Redeployment in Hebron,99 signed January 17, 1997, and the
Agreement on Temporary International Presence in Hebron
(“TIPH II Agreement”), signed on January 21, 1997 between
Israel and the Palestinians.100
The TIPH II Agreement directs the following general
conduct and aims of the TIPH II mission: (1) it is to be stationed
and operate in the city of Hebron,101 where it is granted freedom
of movement;102 (2) it is to create a feeling of security among the
Palestinians living in Hebron;103 (3) in all its activities, it will
relate to the city of Hebron as one city;104 (4) its organizational
structure, operational guidelines, logistics, support, privileges
and immunities shall be with the agreement of the two sides;105
and (5) its personnel shall have no military or police functions
and they will not interfere in disputes, incidents, or the activities
of Israeli security forces or the Palestinian police.106 TIPH
personnel wear distinctive uniforms and do not carry weapons.107
Building on the uniqueness of the TIPH I, the mandate of
TIPH II includes goals that are not typical of traditional
peacekeeping. TIPH II might be more accurately described in
terms of the integrated force referred to in the UN Report on
Peacekeeping Operations, comprising peacekeeping as well as socioeconomic aims. TIPH II is mandated
1. to promote by their presence a feeling of security to the
Palestinians of Hebron;

99. Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, Isr.-P.L.O, Jan. 21, 1997, 36
I.L.M. 650.
100. Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron
and Memorandum of Understanding, Isr.-P.L.O., art. 1, Jan. 21, 2007, 36 I.L.M. 547
[hereinafter TIPH II Agreement].
101. Id.
102. Id. art. 9.
103. Id. art. 1.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. art. 3.
107. Id. art. 8. Under Article 8 of the TIPH II Agreement, TIPH personnel may
carry pistols for self-defense; however, weapons are not mentioned in the Memorandum
of Understanding on the Establishment of a Temporary International Presence in
Hebron signed by the participating countries, and in practice, TIPH personnel are
unarmed. See Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Temporary
International Presence in Hebron, Jan. 30, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 549 [hereinafter TIPH
MOU].
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2. to help promote stability and an appropriate environment
conducive to the enhancement of the well-being of the
Palestinians of Hebron and their economic development;
3. to observe the enhancement of peace and prosperity
among Palestinians;
4. to assist in the promotion and execution of projects
initiated by the donor countries; [and]
5. to encourage economic development and growth in
Hebron.108

As TIPH II was created by agreement between the parties
themselves, its conduct is fully subject to the consent and
direction of the parties. Importantly, the finances of TIPH II are
also borne by the participating countries.109
TIPH II is required to report any incidents or issues
occurring in Hebron to a joint committee comprising Palestinian
and Israeli representatives.110 TIPH II produces several types of
reports submitted to various committees comprising Palestinian,
Israeli, and TIPH II representation, or to the governments of the
participating countries. The joint committee is mandated to meet
weekly or at the request of a committee member.111 Further,
TIPH II is mandated to coordinate its activities and policy with a
Monitoring and Steering Committee, which was intended to be
established in terms of the Interim Agreement.112 While the
Committee has not yet been established, such reports are
submitted to senior government representatives of the two
parties.113
It should be noted when assessing the overall success of
TIPH II that the mission was mandated ultimately to “promote”
the feeling of security and stability of the Palestinian residents of
Hebron through the presence of the mission. It was not
mandated to become directly involved in the political or social
interactions between the Israeli and Palestinian residents of
Hebron or to enforce peaceful relations between them, nor is its
role to act as a buffer between Israeli and Palestinian security
forces. As such, the operations of TIPH II are limited to
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

TIPH II Agreement, supra note 100, art. 5.
Id.
Id. art. 7.
Id.
Id.
TIPH MOU, supra note 107, art. B.
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reporting incidents and issues to the parties, thus promoting a
feeling of representation.
Overall, it may be said that TIPH II has met with a
significant measure of success in carrying out its mandate. The
majority of the city’s residents are aware of TIPH’s presence and
are of the opinion that reporting an incident to TIPH will
improve the situation, and feel optimistic about the future.114
However, a majority of the residents of Hebron also report
feeling less secure.115 In fairness, this increased sense of insecurity
may not be an indicator solely of TIPH’s effectiveness, but may
also reflect larger external political issues.
TIPH II is a unique mission and its civil confidence-building
mandate is significantly different from the type of mandate
envisaged for peacekeeping forces intended to fulfill a security
role in a proposed Israeli-Palestinian peace accord.
3. The Multinational Force in Lebanon
In August 1982, the United States brokered an agreement to
end the fighting and evacuate PLO and Syrian forces from
Beirut, then under siege by Israeli troops in the course of
Operation Peace for Galilee (“First Lebanon War”).116 The
agreement provided for the deployment of a Multinational Force
in Lebanon to oversee the evacuation of the PLO and Syrian
forces.117 The MNF, composed of troops from France, Italy, and
the United States began its deployment on August 21, 1982, and
withdrew on August 30, following the evacuation of the PLO.118

114. TIPH, Addressing the Perception of TIPH in Hebron—Opinion Poll 2007,
http://www.tiph.org/?module=Files;action=File.getFile;ID=1617 (last visited Sept. 29,
2010).
115. Id.
116. See Ronald F. Baczkowski, Tactical Lessons for Peacekeeping: U.S. Multinational
Force in Beirut 1982–1984, GLOBALSECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
library/report/1995/BRF.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2010); see also US Multinational Force
[USMNF] Lebanon, GLOBALSECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/
usmnf.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2010) [hereinafter USMNF].
117. See Baczkowski, supra note 116; see also John H. Kelly, Lebanon: 1982–1984, in
U.S. AND RUSSIAN POLICYMAKING WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF FORCE 85, 92 (Jeremy R.
Azrael & Emil A. Payin eds., 1996).
118. See Kelly, supra note 117, at 92–93; see also Baczkowski, supra note 116; USMNF,
supra note 116.
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On September 14, 1982, Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel
was assassinated.119 This was followed, two days later, by the
massacre of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee
camps by members of the Lebanese Phalangist militia.120 In the
wake of these events, US President Ronald Reagan deployed the
US Multinational Force (“USMNF”) in Lebanon to help the
Lebanese government restore and maintain stability.121 During
the course of 1983, the USMNF and US missions in Lebanon
were the targets of terrorist attacks. On April 18, 1983, the US
embassy in West Beirut was bombed.122 On October 23, 1983,
suicide bombers attacked the US Marine and French Paratrooper
barracks in Beirut, killing 241 Americans and 56 French
servicemen.123 Additionally, from August 1983 onward, American
forces found themselves increasingly involved in fighting against
Lebanese militias.124 Under mounting Congressional pressure,
the President ordered the withdrawal of USMNF, which was
completed on February 26, 1984.125
II. UN AND NON-UN-MANDATED MISSIONS: FACTORS FOR
SUCCESS AND FAILURE
As the above analysis has shown, UN peacekeeping missions
have met varying degrees of success and failure. The following
sections will examine the various factors that may contribute to
or detract from the effectiveness of a peacekeeping mission.
A. The Mandate
The mandate of UN peacekeeping missions is the result of
political compromise among the many UN member states in the
course of the process of authorizing a peacekeeping mission. The
process of compromise may yield a mandate too vague and too
119. See Kelly, supra note 117, at 92–93; USMNF, supra note 116.
120. See USMNF, supra note 116; see also Kelly, supra note 117, at 93.
121. See Kelly, supra note 117, at 93–94; USMNF, supra note 116.
122. See Baczkowski, supra note 116; see also Kelly, supra note 117, at 98; USMNF,
supra note 116.
123. See Kelly, supra note 117, at 101–02; see also Baczkowski, supra note 116;
USMNF, supra note 116.
124. See Kelly, supra note 117, at 98–99 (describing the increased attacks on the
Marines of the MNF by militia groups).
125. For a detailed history and assessment, see id. at 102–03; Baczkowski, supra note
116.
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broadly phrased to serve as an effective guide for action. The
same process may also yield a mandate that is too limited in its
scope. As William Orbach succinctly notes:
The United Nations is not an independent entity, but an
international arena in miniature where most international
conflicts and disputes are reenacted. It is a microcosm of the
larger international reality. In this institution all
international conflicts—military, economic, and political—
are reflected in and, to a certain extent, transferred to the
political plane. The United Nations is not an actor on the
international stage, but a microcosm of that stage.126

This point was made even more emphatically in the
recommendations of the Brahimi Report. In the section entitled
“Clear, credible and achievable mandates,” the report states:
As a political body, the Security Council focuses on
consensus-building, even though it can take decisions with
less than unanimity. But the compromises required to build
consensus can be made at the expense of specificity, and the
resulting ambiguity can have serious consequences in the
field if the mandate is then subject to varying interpretation
by different elements of a peace operation, or if local actors
perceive a less than complete Council commitment to peace
implementation that offers encouragement to spoilers.
Ambiguity may also paper over differences that emerge later,
under pressure of a crisis, to prevent urgent Council action.
While it acknowledges the utility of political compromise in
many cases, the Panel comes down in this case on the side of
clarity, especially for operations that will deploy into
dangerous circumstances. Rather than send an operation
into danger with unclear instructions, the Panel urges that
the Council refrain from mandating such a mission.127

For example, the mandates of UNIFIL I and II—calling,
inter alia, for the mission to restore international peace and
security, as well as the effective authority of the Lebanese
government—set out aims so broad and intangible as to be
impractical. On the other hand, a mandate calling for a mission

126. WILLIAM W. ORBACH, TO KEEP THE PEACE: THE UNITED NATIONS
CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTION 136 (1977).
127. Brahimi Report, supra note 11, ¶ 56.
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to act solely as a buffer128 or to supervise the withdrawal of a force
and the cessation of hostilities per the mandates of UNEF I and
II and UNDOF, may not provide the mission with sufficient
latitude for an effective response to hostilities or a breach of the
ceasefire. Of course, whenever it becomes necessary to extend
the mission’s mandate, the time-consuming political process of
compromise begins anew.
As opposed to UN peacekeeping missions, the process of
drafting the mandates of multinational peacekeeping operations
may be less susceptible to the shortcomings inherent in the UN
drafting process. Where the mandate is drafted primarily by the
parties, it is more likely that the mandate will more accurately
address their concerns, and may be expected to provide
mechanisms that the parties themselves deem necessary and
adequate for the effective achievement of the peacekeeping goals
that they have established.
The mandates of the MFO and TIPH II may serve as
examples of this conflict-specific focus that may be achieved
when a peacekeeping force is established primarily in accordance
with guidelines established by the parties to the conflict. Thus,
for example, the MFO mandate was drafted in the context of a
peace treaty between two previously warring states. The
peacekeeping functions of the MFO are therefore security
focused and are intended to reinforce the peace treaty. The
TIPH II mandate was drafted to address civil unrest in the volatile
social context of Hebron. The role of that mission as an address
for reporting grievances and promoting socio-economic
objectives are of particular significance, as is reflected in the
mandate.
Moreover, because the mandate of a non-UN peacekeeping
mission is a product of negotiations between the parties and is
meant to address their specific concerns, amendments to the
mandate necessary for it to be effective can be decided upon by
128. This, for example, was the mandate of the United Nations Military Observer
Group in India and Pakistan (“UNMOGIP”), about which the UN Secretary General
stated: “Because the role of UNMOGIP appears frequently to be misunderstood, it bears
emphasis that the operation has no authority or function entitling it to enforce or
prevent anything, or to try to ensure that the Cease-Fire is respected.” U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Report by the Secretary-General on the Current Situation in Kashmir with
Particular Reference to the Cease-Fire Agreement, the Cease-Fire Line and the
Functioning of UNMOGIP, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/6651 (Sept. 3, 1965).
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the parties to the conflict, and while they will require the consent
of the contributing states, the process should be far more
efficient than the parallel UN process.
B.

Political Support

Any peacekeeping mission will necessarily be subject to
shifting political winds. Changes in political alignments and
commitments are not exclusive to the diplomatic process of the
UN. They can arise among and within the states contributing
forces or support to a multinational force, and they can affect the
conduct of the mission and its staying power. An example of this
is the withdrawal of MNF, described in Section II D.3, and by the
withdrawal of the Polish contingent from UNIFIL in 2009.129
Another example is the extraction of Belgian troops from the
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda following the
death of ten Belgian troops and continued threats against
Belgian nationals.130 The recent collapse of the Netherland’s
coalition government due to disagreements on extending the
deployment of Dutch forces in Afghanistan also provides an
instructive example.131
In the case of UN peacekeeping missions, an additional
element that must be borne in mind is the possibility of a veto,
either because of a threat to the direct interests or ambitions of a
permanent member of the Security Council or in deference to its
political alliances.132
129. See
November
2009:
Lebanon,
SECURITY
COUNCIL
REPORT,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.5566459/k.E00/
November_2009brLebanon.htm (noting that the Polish contingent was due to withdraw
in October 2009). On the prospect that France, Italy, and Spain may follow suit, see
Yaakov Katz, Israel Concerned Indonesia Might Take Charge of UNIFIL Naval Force,
JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 28, 2010, at 3.
130. See United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, U.N. DEP’T OF PUB. INFO.,
Sept. 1996, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unamir_b.htm.
131. Ian Traynor, Dutch Coalition Collapses after Row Over Troops’ Afghan Mission,
GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 22, 2010, at 24.
132. Examples are: the USSR’s veto of the American proposal in regard to the
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (“UNOGIL”) in 1958, see United
Nations Peacekeeping, Lebanon—UNOGIL Background, http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/missions/past/unogilbackgr.html#one (last visited Mar. 3, 2010); the
veto by the Ukrainian SSR and USSR of the proposal for a UN peacekeeping mission to
Lebanon in February 1984, see S.C. Res. France: Revised Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc.
S/16351/Rev. 2 (Feb. 28, 1984); and the threatened Soviet veto that led to the
establishment of the MFO, see HOUGHTON & TRINKA, supra note 56.
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C. Bias or Perception of Bias
One of the basic principles in a UN mission is neutrality or
impartiality.133 Indeed, impartiality was one of the originally
envisaged underpinnings of a UN peacekeeping mission, as first
conceived by Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN Secretary General
under whom peacekeeping missions were most broadly
developed.134 A peacekeeping mission that is perceived as biased
by one of the parties to a conflict may face insurmountable
difficulties to carrying out its mandate. A suspicious party may
refrain from fully cooperating with the mission, viewing its
cooperation as futile or even potentially harmful to its own
interests.
While the problems arising from actual bias and perceived
bias may be different, ultimately either can result in the failure of
the mission. Indeed, arguably, a perception of bias may be more
difficult to address as the bias may not be demonstrable, and
there may be no concrete steps that might serve to change the
perception.
Perceptions and accusations of bias have been particularly
prominent in regard to UNIFIL, which has, at various times, been
accused of bias by Israel, Lebanon, and Hezbollah.135 In addition
to evidence of actual bias in its conduct toward the parties, or
perceptions of bias that may arise from ineffectiveness of the
mission in carrying out its mission from the perspective of one of
the parties, UN peacekeeping missions are also susceptible to
being perceived as operating in accordance with the political
agendas of the contributing countries or biases of the United
Nations itself.
Some of the pitfalls arising from distrust and perceptions of
bias may be avoided in the case of multinational peacekeeping
forces where the contributing powers are agreed upon by the
parties to the conflict. Of course it is not impossible that a
multinational force could be the subject of accusations of bias. In
a highly politicized climate, and specifically in the context of
133. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 13.
134. CHARLES C. MOSKOS, PEACE SOLDIERS 25–26 (1976).
135. See Hagai Segal, Is the UN up to the Task of Peacemaker?, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST (H.K.), Aug. 15, 2006, at A13; Lebanon Blasts Called “Spy Devices”, ALJAZEERA
(Doha), Oct. 19, 2009, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/10/
2009101918327389491.html.
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politically sensitive issues that form the background to any
peacekeeping force, bias and subjectivity are typically of concern.
However, the active involvement of the parties to the conflict in
the establishment, selection, and continued operations of the
force can contribute to attenuating distrust and perceptions of
bias. Where the peacekeeping force operates in concert with the
parties toward attaining mutually desired goals, the underlying
suspicions that feed perceptions of bias may be further reduced.
Moreover, joint control and structured mechanisms for
addressing grievances may also prove effective in responding to
the concerns of the parties.
D. Rules of Engagement
Dag Hammarskjöld envisaged a UN peacekeeping force as a
conciliation force that does not engage in combat activities.136 In
keeping with this vision, the rules of engagement for UN
peacekeeping forces have been very circumscribed. The
fundamental rule is that the peacekeeping soldier is only
permitted to use force in self-defense.137 Unfortunately, the term
“self-defense” is not unambiguous. Individual self-defense is
always permitted to UN peacekeepers.138 After all, as has been
noted, no country would contribute its troops to a UN mission
unless they are permitted to defend themselves if attacked.139
However, problems arise when self-defense requires actions that
go beyond the limits of personal defense, extending to the
defense of the mission or actions intended to facilitate the
accomplishment of the mission’s mandate. Limiting the resort to
the use of force to a strict definition of self-defense may render
the mission unviable. Where, for example, the peacekeeping
mission faces militias or guerilla groups actively seeking to
undermine peacekeeping activities, such as in the case of
Hezbollah in Lebanon, a peacekeeping force empowered to use
force only when attacked will be hard pressed to fulfill its
peacekeeping mandate. The Capstone Doctrine notes:
The environments into which United Nations
peacekeeping operations are deployed are often
136.
137.
138.
139.

MOSKOS, supra note 134, at 25.
Id. at 131
Id.
Id.
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characterized by the presence of militias, criminal gangs, and
other spoilers who may actively seek to undermine the peace
process or pose a threat to the civilian population. In such
situations, the Security Council has given United Nations
peacekeeping operations “robust” mandates authorizing
them to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts
to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under
imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national
authorities in maintaining law and order.140

While this broad concept of “robust” self-defense seeks to
address a real problem in defining the appropriate limits of self
defense and the need to expand the meaning of the term so that
its limitations do not thwart the peacekeeping mission, it is
inherently problematic.
While refraining from using force may make a peacekeeping
operation ineffective, fuel perceptions of bias, and even cause the
parties to the conflict to view the mission as a hindrance, the
resort to force is itself not without dangers. As the Capstone
Doctrine recognizes, “The use of force by a United Nations
peacekeeping operation always has political implications and can
often give rise to unforeseen circumstances.”141 Moreover, a
decision to use force must be mindful of “the effect that such
action will have on national and local consent for the mission.”142
A multinational force faces similar problems in defining its
rules of engagement. However, as a force working in concert with
the parties to the conflict toward achieving mutually desired
goals, the danger of a loss of confidence and consent may be
reduced. The cooperative basis for its operations may also make
it possible to better adapt the rules of engagement to the specific
conditions under which it operates, and more specifically, define
what is permitted in given circumstances. This could lead to
greater mission effectiveness as well as greater confidence in the
ability of the mission to carry out its operational tasks.
While seeking to address real problems impacting the
effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, the concept of
“robust” self-defense raises two additional, inter-related problems
in regard to any peacekeeping operation: exposure to increased
140. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 13, at 34.
141. Id. at 35
142. Id.
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casualties and erosion of political support. The active use of force
unavoidably increases the exposure of peacekeepers to danger. It
may also cause third-party spoilers to view the peacekeepers not
merely as a hindrance but as a hostile force and a legitimate
target. The willingness and motivation of peacekeepers to expose
themselves to the dangers of combat cannot be assumed. The
loss of life attendant to such actions, whether to the forces
themselves or from the collateral risks to the local populace, may
also make continued participation in the mission unpopular in
the contributing states and lead to a demand for the withdrawal
of the peacekeepers.
E.

Command and Control

In general, the United Nations command structure is largely
decentralized, with operational authority vested in individual
force and police commanders in the field.143 These commanders
are answerable to a civilian Special Representative of the
Secretary General (“SRSG”)144 who provides strategic decisionmaking for mandate implementation.145 The Under Secretary
General for Peacekeeping Operations has overall responsibility,
while the United Nations Headquarters in New York (“UNHQ”)
provides overall strategic guidance.146 In less complex missions,
this decentralized command and control structure of UN
operations is feasible. However, when faced with more intricate,
robust missions, the UN command and control model becomes
problematic as there is a “growing gap between increasingly
ambitious mandates and limited military capacities”147 such that
“[t]he UN model thus seems to combine the worst of two worlds:

143. See BRUCE JONES ET AL., NYU CTR. ON INT’L COOPERATION, BUILDING ON
BRAHIMI: PEACEKEEPING IN AN ERA OF STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY 41 (2009) [hereinafter
BUILDING ON BRAHIMI]; Jean-Marie Guéhenno & Jake Sherman, Command and Control
Arrangements in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, International Forum for the
Challenges of Peace Operations, ¶ 16, Nov. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peace_ssr/docs/Background%20Paper_Command%20and%20
Control%20Arrangements%20in%20UN%20Peacekeeping%20Operations_9%20Novem
ber%202008.pdf.
144. BUILDING ON BRAHIMI, supra note 143, at 41.
145. Guéhenno & Sherman, supra note 143, ¶16.
146. Id.
147. Id. ¶ 4.
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too much military decentralization and too much political
control over the conduct of military operations.”148
The more complex peacekeeping missions face many issues
and challenges that are directly relevant to the mission’s success
or failure. One such prominent issue is that force commanders
and SRSG’s face increased challenges to their authority and
command over the peacekeeping troops as the levels of danger
and threat to the peacekeepers increase.149 In such situations,
national chains of command of the individual contributing states
tend to become more prominent, competing with the established
command structure.150 Further, as danger levels increase,
tensions may rise between the civilian command structure at
UNHQ and the commanders in the field.151 The political
consensus informing the interpretation and implementation of
the mandate at UNHQ might conflict fundamentally with that of
the force commanders in the field, and in particular with the
increased national military interests of each contributing
member state.
Another issue faced in the more complex missions is the
distance between UNHQ, where overall strategy is planned, and
the theater of operations, where operative decisions are taken. In
the Command and Control Arrangements Report, the authors
refer to the difficulty involved in “[s]triking the right balance
between creating a sense of ownership in the mission and
maintaining UN control [as] . . . a delicate, but essential task.”152
In this regard, the authors note that “[t]oo much
decentralization can make such control difficult.”153 Of course,
strategic high-level control at United Nations level is subject to
the broader political considerations that may not be relevant or
significant for the operational decisions taken in light of the
realities on the ground. This is particularly acute in the context
of “missions [that] concern regional or great powers, as in . . .
the Middle East.”154 Further problematic issues in this context
arise where
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id.
Id. ¶ 21.
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[d]ifferent members of the Security Council may have
different expectations with the mission, and they may try to
influence it directly, through their nationals in the mission.
It may then put the Secretariat in a delicate situation if a
high-risk operation encouraged by a Member State goes
wrong, or if it is seen as contradicting the interpretation of
the mandate made by other Member States.155

At times, national units have informally and quietly, without
the knowledge of UNHQ, informed the force commander as to
the limits of their engagement (instead of making them clear in
official caveats inserted into their initial memoranda of
understanding arranged with UNHQ). This leads to even greater
distance between UNHQ and reduces the overall effectiveness of
the force.156 Furthermore, for the selection of the SRSG to be a
political choice—and “[t]he selection of Force Commanders has
also been politicized at times.”157
These command and control issues can negatively affect
peacekeeping missions, particularly those that call for robust
action and a multi-dimensional approach. The tension between
the overall strategic vision, largely politically guided, and the
military needs dictated by realities on the ground can be
extreme.
The less complex command structure of a force operating in
concert with the parties to the conflict may mitigate these
problematic aspects of the UN-mandated mission. Moreover,
because the overall strategic aims and the specific operational
activities are aimed at achieving the same goals, the interaction
between the two levels is likely to be less strained. Nevertheless,
the involvement of several parties—even under a unified
command—cannot entirely avoid all of the political and practical
problems that may arise when the peacekeeping force must
achieve consent from a number of actors. Even when all the
actors aspire to a common goal, they do not necessarily share the
same military or political culture, and are not free of political
interests and pressures.

155. Id.
156. Id. ¶ 19.
157. Id. ¶ 30.

2010]

PEACEKEEPERS IN ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE
F.

33

Financing

The Building on Brahimi report notes that the total costs of
UN peacekeeping missions have steadily increased, with the
budget for UN peacekeeping reaching US$8 billion in 2008–
2009, marking a ten percent increase over the 2007–2008 period
and a five-fold increase in just under a decade.158 Further, the
largest funders of the UN peacekeeping missions are also
typically the main contributors towards other international
military or regional groupings such as NATO or the EU.159 With
their funding commitments split, and with UN peacekeeping
becoming increasingly complex and expensive, maintaining the
required level of commitment to funding UN peacekeeping
missions cannot be taken for granted. The global financial crisis
will certainly be a complicating factor. It is also important to
realize that funding can be exploited as a means for exerting
political control over the scope and operations of a mission.
The funding models of non-UN-mandated forces present
certain advantages, even if they are not without problems. A nonUN-mandated force, established by an agreement between the
parties, should be funded primarily by the parties themselves, as
in the cases of TIPH I and II and the MFO. Where possible, this
financial model can yield a number of advantageous
consequences in terms of the commitment of the parties to the
success of the mission. Of course, as Diehl points out, the risk of
financial “blackmail” of a mission remains possible in the
multinational force context, including the possibility that a party
could withhold financial commitments in order to leverage
control over the conduct of a mission.160 Moreover, while
maintaining a civilian observer force like TIPH may be relatively
affordable, equipping and maintaining a robust military
peacekeeping operation may be beyond the independent
resources of the parties, and may require some third-party
funding, either directly or through earmarked foreign aid to the
parties. Another model, employed in part in funding the MFO, is
one in which some states provide funds exclusively for
maintaining the force, while other states provide personnel.

158. BUILDING ON BRAHIMI, supra note 143, at 6.
159. Id.
160. DIEHL, supra note 18, at 135.
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G. Troop Composition
A UN peacekeeping force is composed of troops from
various and sometimes numerous countries. A single
peacekeeping mission can be comprised of troops from as many
as thirty different countries (as in the case of UNIFIL II). This
can be the source of a variety of problems. On the one end of the
scale are more technical problems, such as language and cultural
differences that may lead to serious breakdowns in
communications. Differences in military training and approach
can also hamper the smooth operation of the mission. Another
factor that cannot be overlooked is that of differing military
cultures and the possibility that contingents from different
participating countries may be bound by different rules of
engagement and even conflicting legal approaches, either
deriving from their domestic law or arising from treaty
obligations. Among the more complex issues that may arise are
those deriving from the possible bias of troops from certain
national contingents. The willingness of host countries to
cooperate with troops from hostile nations can also lead to
problems of cooperation. For example, both Iran and Poland
contributed troops to UNDOF, but neither maintained
diplomatic relations with Israel at the time. This complicated
Israeli cooperation with UNDOF’s freedom of movement.161
Some of these problems can be mitigated by limiting the
number of participating states and by adopting appropriate
vetting procedures. Such steps are inherently better suited to a
multinational force option than to a UN force. The MFO and
TIPH II would appear to provide successful models in this
regard.
Nevertheless, the UN model enjoys an advantage in its
ability to turn to a broader base. For example, the domestic law
of some countries prohibits the contribution of troops to nonUN-mandated missions.162 Additionally, some countries may
perceive a UN mandate as granting greater legitimacy to the
mission, a factor that may be important in its internal political
161. HOUGHTON & TRINKA, supra note 56, at 9. This problem was most recently
addressed in regard to the prospect that command of UNIFIL’s naval force may be
taken over by Indonesia, a country that does not maintain diplomatic relations with
Israel. See Katz, supra note 129.
162. See Katz, supra note 129.
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debate. Further, it is has been argued that national domestic
concerns could make a country more inclined to withdraw its
forces deployed under a national flag than those deployed under
the UN flag.163
H. Involvement/Commitment of the Parties
Consent of the parties is regarded as a basic principle of UN
peacekeeping.164 The greater the involvement of the parties, and
the greater their commitment to the peacekeeping mission and
to the eventual resolution of the underlying conflict, the more
likely that the peacekeeping mission will succeed. While it is
hoped that a UN peacekeeping force set up and operating in the
context of a peace agreement will enjoy the full support of the
parties, unequivocal support cannot be assumed or assured. The
drafters of the Capstone Doctrine were aware of this issue:
The absence of trust between the parties in a post-conflict
environment can, at times, make consent uncertain and
unreliable. Consent, particularly if given grudgingly under
international pressure, may be withdrawn in a variety of ways
when a party is not fully committed to the peace process. For
instance . . . [by] restrict[ing] the operation’s freedom of
action, resulting in a de facto withdrawal of consent . . . . The
fact that the main parties have given their consent to the
deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation
does not necessarily imply or guarantee that there will also
be consent at the local level, particularly if the main parties
are internally divided or have weak command and control
systems. Universality of consent becomes even less probable
in volatile settings, characterized by the presence of armed
groups not under the control of any of the parties, or by the
presence of other spoilers . . . . A peacekeeping operation
must have the political and analytical skills, the operational
resources, and the will to manage situations where there is
an absence or breakdown of local consent. In some cases this
may require, as a last resort, the use of force.165

Arguably, in circumstances like those described above, a
multinational force created by the agreement of the parties will

163. DIEHL, supra note 18, at 139.
164. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 13, at 31.
165. Id. at 32–33.
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enjoy a distinct advantage. Ownership of the process is likely to
produce better results than submission of the process to a body
in which the political considerations and national interests of
other states play a significant role. As Jett observes, “[A]n
agreement that has been facilitated rather than mediated,
inherently has a better chance for success because the parties
have greater responsibility for the agreement’s shape.”166 But
attaining the level of cooperation required for the establishment
of an effective multinational presence may not be practical in the
absence of basic trust between the parties to the conflict. A
significant presence of “spoilers” may also argue in favor of a UNmandated operation where such a mission might enjoy greater
legitimacy in the eyes of the parties to the conflict.
I.

Spoilers

The problem of spoilers is addressed in the Capstone
Doctrine.167 It is counted among the factors likely to affect
peacekeeping operations in the next three to seven years, as
described in the 2009 NYU Report:
First, spoilers: as the Brahimi Report established, even where
there is broad support for a political process, splinter groups,
rogue actors or individuals may use violence to undermine
the process, and missions must be able to respond to them.
The spoiler problem is greater when (i) there are several
parties to the conflict; (ii) spoilers include groups motivated
by factors outside the immediate conflict, such as
international terrorist networks; or (iii) spoilers include
factions of a recognized government.168

The presence of spoilers cannot be discounted in the context of
both the UN-mandated peacekeeping forces and the non-UNmandated multinational forces. By definition, spoilers are
external to the process and antagonistic to it.
The moral or symbolic value of a UN-mandated
peacekeeping force as “an international force representing the
world community’s desire for peace”169 may well be a factor in its
favor, as the authors have proposed elsewhere in this Article.
166.
167.
168.
169.

JETT, supra note 16, at 53.
See Capstone Doctrine, supra note 13, at 4.
BUILDING ON BRAHIMI, supra note 143, at 17.
DIEHL, supra note 18, at 35.
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However, it would be a mistake to overemphasize the deterrent
factor of “international legitimacy.” Non-state spoilers act outside
of the norms of international humanitarian law. Reciprocity is
not relevant to their conduct and they have nothing to gain by
adherence to the rules. The idea that “[a]ny protagonist
choosing to renew hostilities will bear the costs of international
disapproval and perhaps sanctions”170 is an empty threat in
regard to armed militias, terrorists, and other spoilers that have
no presence at the United Nations, that are, by their nature,
already the subjects of international disapproval, and for which
the threat of sanctions is irrelevant.
J.

Regional Players

The significant role of regional players in the success of a
peacekeeping mission is referred to in the Capstone Doctrine,
which notes that “[t]he attitude of neighbouring states can be as
important a factor in determining the viability of a peace process,
as the commitment of the local parties, some of whom may even
be acting as proxies for neighbouring states.”171
Again, as is the case with spoilers, the presence of
destructive regional players, in particular where they act through
local agents, such as local militias or terror networks, is
problematic for both UN-mandated and non-UN-mandated
peacekeeping missions. Here, too, the threat of sanctions may be
of little relevance when neighboring states maintain deniability
by acting through proxies.
III. THE ISRAELI CALCULATION—RISK VERSUS BENEFIT
Peacekeeping operations have been a common element in
the context of the ongoing conflict between Israel and her
neighbors. Although no peacekeeping provisions were
established under the Treaty of Peace between Israel and
Jordan,172 or as part of the Declaration of Principles on Interim

170. Id.
171. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 13, at 50.
172. See Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan, Isr.-Jordan, Oct. 26, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 43 [hereinafter Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty].
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Self-Government Arrangements173 or the Israeli-Palestinian
Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,174 the
establishment of a peacekeeping force is widely assumed to be
integral to any future Israeli-Palestinian peace accord.
The two basic models for peacekeeping are the UNmandated peacekeeping force and the non-UN multinational
force. Both of these models have been tried in the context of the
Arab-Israeli conflict with varying degrees of success. The question
to be addressed now is whether the adoption of one of those
models would make a constructive contribution to the peaceful
relations between Israel and a future Palestinian state.
Peacekeeping missions are particularly successful in
fulfilling their mandate in regard to conflicts that have already
been resolved. The success of a peacekeeping mission is directly
proportional to the level of mutual trust, commitment, and
cooperation of the parties to the conflict: the stronger those
elements, the greater the success. The NYU Report states this in
another way: “[C]redible political process and credible military
presence should reinforce one another. Ideally, they are inversely
related: the more credible the political process, the less the need
for a military presence.”175 Parties to a conflict or to a process
intended to resolve a conflict should not imagine that a
peacekeeping mission can be a substitute for any of those
elements. Just as a peacekeeping mission will reinforce the
positive, it has the potential to highlight and even exacerbate the
negative. It may even become a source of friction or a target, and
thus contribute to further deterioration.
A. Best-Case Scenario
In the situation envisaged by those who propose a
peacekeeping force as part of the resolution of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, the force is intended to be an element of the
final status. It is proposed neither as a facilitator for conflict
resolution nor as a buffer between the parties that will enable
them to negotiate in a less contentious atmosphere. This would
173. See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Isr.),
Sept. 13, 1993, avaiable at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+
Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Principles.htm.
174. See Interim Agreement, supra note 97.
175. BUILDING ON BRAHIMI, supra note 143, at 17.
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seem to provide a strong basis for the success of a peacekeeping
operation.
In a best-case scenario, following the resolution of a conflict
by parties committed to peaceful coexistence, the example of the
MFO reinforces the positive view. Indeed, in such an ideal
situation, each of the peacekeeping options offers certain
advantages.
Because mutual trust, commitment to maintaining peace,
and cooperation directly affect peacekeeping success, there
would seem to be an inherent advantage to missions that are
created by the parties and that are answerable to them. Such
missions are an expression of the cooperation and ongoing
commitment and may serve to enhance mutual trust. They also
avoid some of the political pitfalls discussed above. From an
Israeli perspective, this type of multinational force may also be
preferable inasmuch as Israel tends not to view the UN as a
particularly hospitable forum. Moreover, the possibility that the
force might receive its marching orders in accordance with the
political consensus of the UN member states might be seen by
Israel as a cause for worry. However, to the extent that the
Palestinians might view the UN as a supportive forum and an ally,
the Palestinians might prefer the UN option. This option might
also be deemed preferable for the Palestinians for the perception
of “international legitimacy” that may be important both from a
domestic and pan-Arab political perspective. While a UNmandated multinational force would directly conflict with the
Israeli interest, a multinational force consisting of solely the
parties to the conflict might be seen to serve it.
Ultimately, in a best-case scenario, the decreasing need for
peacekeeping means that the most important function of the
operation is its physical and ultimately symbolic presence. The
bottom line is that Israel has to consider what type of force would
best serve this largely emblematic role, while bearing in mind
such factors as the proximity of the frontier to Israeli population
centers and the perception of the force by the Israeli public.
Of course, a third possibility in such an atmosphere of
commitment and cooperation is the adoption of security
arrangements like those set out in the Israeli-Jordanian Peace
Treaty. In that framework, the parties agreed upon security
relations based upon “mutual trust, advancement of joint
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interests and co-operation,”176 and upon a consultation and
liaison mechanism for addressing questions of implementation
without the involvement of third parties. That arrangement
appears to have resulted in significant success.
B.

Worst-Case Scenarios

As the Brahimi Report duly notes, “the Secretariat must not
apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where the
local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behaviour.”177
This need to consider worst-case scenarios is also noted in the
Capstone Doctrine, which observes that “[p]lanning based solely
on short-term engagement and best case scenarios has rarely
proven to be a successful basis for the deployment of a United
Nations peacekeeping mission and should be avoided.”178 This
trenchant observation must be borne in mind when considering
the appropriate approach to peacekeeping in the context of an
Israeli-Palestinian accord.
While the future cannot accurately be predicted, past and
present reality can serve as the basis for suggesting certain
elements of possible worst-case scenarios. Among these elements
are the following possible factors: (1) the government of the
Palestinian state may not be committed wholeheartedly to
peaceful relations, or may deem an overt or overly zealous
commitment to peace to be an obstacle to its internal political
interests; (2) Hamas or other opponents of the peace agreement
may violently oppose the Palestinian government; (3) Hamas or
other opponents of the peace agreement may continue to try to
operate against Israel; (4) Israeli settlement blocs or enclaves may
remain within the territory of the Palestinian state and may be
targeted by spoilers; (5) Israeli opponents to the peace
agreement may attempt to reassert their presence in evacuated
areas; (6) Israeli opponents to the peace agreement may attempt
violent opposition to the Palestinian state. Each of these possible
scenarios must be considered in weighing the appropriate
security arrangements to be made as part of a peace accord.

176. Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, supra note 172, art. 4.1(a).
177. Brahimi Report, supra note 11, at x.
178. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 13, at 51.
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If the Palestinian side is not wholly committed to
maintaining peaceful relations, the possibility of establishing an
entente like that of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty is
precluded. Such a situation would also not produce the level of
coordination and cooperation needed for establishing a
multinational force. The remaining option is a UN-mandated
peacekeeping mission operating in a situation that is not
conducive to its success. The extent of its failure to realize its
mission will largely be dictated by the nature of the Palestinians’
lack of commitment and the intensity of spoiler activity.
The scenario in which commitment to peaceful relations is
accompanied by a desire to avoid any overt expression of
cooperation with the former enemy or with the peacekeeping
operation also argues strongly in favor of a peacekeeping
operation rather than a regime of security cooperation between
the parties. On its face, such a situation would seem to favor a
UN-mandated mission, however, the experience of the MFO and
TIPH may support the view that the actual level of cooperation
demanded of the parties may not be to such a degree that it
would appear as overt cooperation or “collaboration.”
The presence of spoilers acting against the Palestinian
government from within the territory of the Palestinian state
raises additional considerations. First, the need to act against
internal spoilers raises a question as to how a government wishes
to be perceived domestically. If the government wishes to be seen
as acting forcefully against its opponents, then it might prefer the
presence of a multinational force acting together with its own
security forces, with full cooperation, intelligence sharing, and
joint leadership. Such a force might also be deemed preferable
by Israel due to the high level of cooperation and because the
exclusion of the UN might be seen as advantageous where the
spoilers may be supported or encouraged by UN member states
that may try to influence or thwart the mission.
If a UN-mandated mission were considered in such
circumstances, it would have to be “robust.”179 Such a
peacekeeping force, operating independently by a UN command
might, at least to some degree, free the Palestinian government
from any appearance of “collaboration” in the fight against other
179. See supra Part II.D.
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Palestinian groups. Such a non-committal position might not be
seen favorably by Israel, and the presence of a UN force might
not allay Israeli security concerns, both because, as stated above,
the spoilers may be supported by or acting on behalf of member
states, and because it would mean that an element of Israel’s
security would be dependent upon a type of peacekeeping
operation that has not proven successful in the past.
Additionally, in this regard, it is worth noting a warning
from the Brahimi Report:
Willingness of Member States to contribute troops to a
credible operation of this sort also implies a willingness to
accept the risk of casualties on behalf of the mandate.
Reluctance to accept that risk has grown since the difficult
missions of the mid-1990s, partly because Member States are
not clear about how to define their national interests in
taking such risks, and partly because they may be unclear
about the risks themselves.180

Experience shows that the possibility that peacekeepers may
become targets and that their involvement in robust
peacekeeping may lead to casualties creates another major
obstacle.
A situation that envisages spoilers acting against Israel is one
that directly addresses Israel’s own domestic security policy. It is
unlikely that Israel would agree to relinquish its right to selfdefense, entrust the protection of its citizens to a foreign agent,
or in any way compromise its sovereignty. The presence of some
kind of multinational force, acting in concert with Israel and
intended to prevent infiltration across Israel’s frontier, might
constitute a positive element in such a situation, but it might also
be viewed as a possible hindrance and obstruction to effective
Israeli action. However, the possibility that the mandate of such a
force might also permit it to act against spoilers within the
Palestinian territory might be seen as an advantage. Such a
mandate, if effective, could avoid the problematic scenario of
Israeli forces violating Palestinian sovereignty in pursuing
terrorist threats. Ideally, however, it would seem preferable that
Israel and the Palestinian state act together in this area, in a
manner similar to the Israeli-Jordanian model, inasmuch as the

180. Brahimi Report, supra note 11, ¶ 52.
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presence of a foreign force operating independently on Israel’s
behalf within the Palestinian state might be domestically
unpalatable to the Palestinian side and further exacerbate the
situation. Here too, the possibility that the peacekeepers might
themselves become targets cannot be ruled out, and the
inevitable casualties incurred in such peacekeeping can
undermine the missions.
The last three scenarios envisage various Israeli elements
that might affect the Israeli approach to incorporating a
peacekeeping force as part of a peace accord. While each
scenario presents its own problems, they share the common
element that in each case Israeli nationals would be confronted
by foreign troops. In the case of Israeli enclaves, the situation
would be one of entirely submitting the safety and security of
Israeli communities to foreign control. This might be
ameliorated, from the perspective of the Israeli nationals, by the
posting of Israeli troops within the communities. But such an
option would mean a permanent Israeli military presence within
the Palestinian state, and could form an ongoing source of
friction. In any case, the idea of placing the security of Israelis
directly in the hands of UN or multinational peacekeepers
would, in all likelihood, be unacceptable in Israeli domestic
politics.
In the case of Israelis attempting to reassert an Israeli or
Jewish presence, for example, in evacuated settlements or sites
like Joseph’s Tomb, experience has shown that confrontations
intended to remove such “demonstrators” may become violent.
This potential for deadly confrontation becomes almost
inevitable considering the possibility of Israelis taking violent
action against the Palestinian state. From the point of view of
Israeli domestic politics, any such situation would preferably be
handled by Israeli security personnel. Perhaps such a unique
arrangement can be made in the framework of a peacekeeping
mandate. It is also possible that proper relations between Israel
and a future Palestinian state, including mutual respect for
sovereignty, would best treat such events as matters of internal
security that should not form part of any peacekeeping mandate,
and should only be addressed in the framework of mutual
security cooperation and foreign relations.
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Indeed, it is worth noting that Article XVII of the Interim
Agreement, addressing the issue of jurisdiction, states, “[I]ssues
that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations:
Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian
refugees, borders, foreign relations and Israelis . . . .”181 It would
appear that the parties envisaged some kind of jurisdictional
arrangement that would not involve foreign actors. At present,
Israelis who enter areas under complete control of the
Palestinian Authority are dealt with by the Palestinian security
authorities, often in cooperation with Israeli authorities. A recent
example was seen in the ancient synagogue in Jericho, where, at
Israel’s request, the Palestinian police at the scene permitted
Israeli border policemen to forcibly remove and arrest the Israeli
demonstrators.182
CONCLUSION
The conventional wisdom is that the success of a future
peace agreement between Israel and an envisaged Palestinian
state would require the support of an international peacekeeping
mission. In this Article, the authors have reviewed the history and
relative success and failure of peacekeeping missions in the
region. The authors have also examined the salient factors that
appear to contribute to the prospects for success or failure of a
peacekeeping mission. On that basis, they have considered the
advantages and disadvantages of the various peacekeeping
options in light of a panoply of factors that may come to play in
worst-case scenarios.
As the authors have noted, there would not appear to be a
definitive answer as to which peacekeeping model is best—in
general or from an Israeli perspective. In certain situations, there
would appear to be a clear preference for a UN-mandated
peacekeeping mission, while other situations would seem better
suited to non-UN-mandated multinational peacekeeping
operations, and still other situations would appear best suited to
bilateral peacekeeping without any foreign participation. Of
course, the picture becomes more complex where more than one

181. Interim Agreement, supra note 97, art. XVII.
182. Chaim Levinson, IDF Arrests 35 Rightists Holed Up in Jericho Synagogue, HAARETZ
(Tel Aviv), Feb. 23, 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1151400.html.
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factor comes into play. Real worst-case scenarios must take into
account the possibility that all potential negative factors may have
to be confronted, and it is such complexity that policy makers
will have to face.
While the assumption in various peace proposals to date has
been that a peacekeeping force is an essential element, it would
appear to the authors that this assumption is incorrect. While
peacekeeping missions have proven successful in certain
situations, they have failed in others. At the same time, it should
be borne in mind that bilateral peacekeeping has shown itself to
be effective along the Israeli-Jordanian border, and bilateral
security cooperation with multinational oversight has succeeded
along the Israeli-Egyptian border. Given the inherent limitations
of peacekeeping in confronting spoilers, and the history of
peacekeeping efforts to contend with spoilers in the region, it
may well be that the common wisdom is mistaken, and that
primarily bilateral security arrangements present the best course.
That would seem to have been the course envisaged by the
parties to the conflict in their negotiations and agreements up
until now. The authors would suggest that it is one that should
not be abandoned.

